When China’s national champions go global:nothing to fear but fear itself? by Du, Ming
When China’s National Champions Go Global: Nothing to Fear 
but Fear Itself? 
Ming DU∗ 
 
Due to the success of the ‘Go Global’ policy, in recent years there has been a dramatic 
increase in overseas direct investment made by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
However, Chinese SOEs’ overseas investment has been viewed with suspicion and 
several attempted acquisitions discontinued in the face of strong opposition from host 
countries. This article analyses the plausibility of some common fears about Chinese 
SOEs’ overseas direct investment and evaluates critically the regulatory responses of the 
US, Canada, Australia and the European Union motivated by such fears. The article 
argues that though some fears are legitimate, they are grossly exaggerated in view of the 
SOE reforms in China over the past three decades. The policy implications of this finding 
for both host countries and China’s ongoing SOE reforms are also explored. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
As an essential part of its government-directed development model, China has adopted a 
government-mandated ‘Go Global’ policy since 2000. The essence of the ‘Go Global’ 
policy is to promote the international operations of capable Chinese firms through 
outbound foreign direct investment (OFDI) with a view to enhancing their international 
competitiveness.1 This policy has been very successful to date. In recent year there has 
been a dramatic increase in Chinese OFDI and an even larger potential for growth.2 In 
2008, while global OFDI fell by 15% as a consequence of the global financial crisis, 
Chinese OFDI flows more than doubled.3 In 2009, when global OFDI plummeted by 
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1 Wayne M. Morrison, China’s Economic Conditions, Congressional Research Service (4 May 2013), at 20; 
Mitchell Silk and Richard Malish, Are Chinese Companies Taking over the World? 7 Chi. J. Int’l L. 105, 
112 (2006). 
2 Nargiza Salidjanova, Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, US-China 
Economic & Security Review Commission Staff Research Report (30 Mar. 2011), at 3. 
3 Ken Davies, Outward FDI from China and Its Policy Context, Columbia FDI Profiles (18 Oct. 2010), at 5. 
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43%, Chinese OFDI still managed to maintain its upward trajectory.4 In 2012, global 
OFDI slid 17% amid uncertainties facing the world economy, whereas Chinese OFDI 
rose 17.6% and hit a record high of USD 87.8 billion, compared to USD 12.3 billion in 
2005. Overall, Chinese companies have made OFDI totaling approximately USD 531.94 
billion by 2012.5 The Heritage Foundation predicted that the Chinese OFDI stock would 
likely reach USD 100 billion annually by 2016.6 Some well-known international brands 
such as IBM, Volvo, Chateau Viaud vineyard, Ferretti luxury yachts and AMC theatres 
are now under the control of Chinese companies. Large scale takeover bids made by 
Chinese investors have been regularly in media spotlight in recent years.7 
However, the ambitious overseas expansion of Chinese companies has not always been 
successful. At least 80% of all Chinese OFDI has been funded by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), among which central SOEs, the largest SOEs financed and owned by 
the Chinese central government and the most likely national champions, contributed 
almost 90%.8 Because of the close connections between Chinese SOEs and the Chinese 
government, investments made by Chinese SOEs have been viewed with suspicion and 
alarm in some Western countries.9 At least partly driven by concerns of Chinese SOEs’ 
investments, a number of countries enacted or revamped their foreign investment laws in 
recent years purporting to address potential risks from Chinese SOEs. A telling example 
is Canada. After the approval of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) 
acquisition of Nexen Inc. on 7 December 2012, the Canadian government on the same 
day announced new and more onerous policy guidance with respect to future proposed 
4 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a Low Carbon Economy (New York and Geneva, 
2010), at 3. 
5 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2013 (New York and Geneva, 2013), at 4; Xinhua, China’s Outbound 
Investment has Great Growth Potential despite Overheating Risk, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2013-09/19/c_132734146.htm. 
6 Derek Scissors, Chinese Investments in the US: Facts and Motives, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2013/05/chinese-investment-in-the-us-facts-and-motives. 
7 Angela Huyue Zhang, Foreign Direct Investment from China: Sense and Sensibility, 34 North Western 
Journal of Law & Business 395 (2014), at 405. 
8 Adrian Wooldridge, The Visible Hand, The Economist (January 2012), at 15. SOEs also play an important 
role in some other emerging markets, such as Russia and Singapore. See Karl P. Sauvant et al. (eds), 
Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions, 10–11 (Oxford U. Press 2012). 
9 Colonel Heino Klinck, The Strategic Implications of Chinese Companies Going Global, US Army War 
College Civilian Research Project (2011), at 74; Alan H. Price et al., Facing the Challenges of SOE 
Investment Abroad, presented to the North American Steel Trade Commission, 12–14 (June 2011). 
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acquisitions by foreign SOEs.10 As if the newly updated SOE policy guidance was not 
adequate to address the concerns, the Economic Action Plan 2013 Act (Bill C-60) 
introduced several further steps in restricting investments by foreign SOEs in Canada in 
June 2013.11 
As a consequence of ambiguity and trepidation towards FDI from China, several major 
attempted acquisitions by Chinese SOEs discontinued in the face of strong opposition 
from host countries.12 A flurry of tightened regulations and the increasingly unpredictable 
regulatory environment in some countries caused Chinese investors to believe that some 
Western governments are unfairly hostile to them. 13  These incidences bring to the 
forefront some challenging conceptual and practical questions. Why are some host 
countries so concerned about investments from China and especially Chinese SOEs? 
How do host countries respond to the perceived threats from Chinese investors? Are their 
concerns and the corresponding regulatory responses justified? Does the recent global 
expansion of Chinese SOEs call for additional international legal rules? If so, how could 
these rules be designed and implemented? This article addresses these questions. Part II 
explains motivations and policy incentives underlying the recent meteoric rise of Chinese 
OFDI. Also explained in part II are reasons why Chinese SOEs cause unique concerns in 
the cross-border context. Part III reviews regulatory responses of the US, Canada, 
Australia and the European Union (EU) in addressing the alleged challenges posed by 
Chinese SOEs’ investment. Part IV reflects on whether the intensified regulatory 
responses are overwrought in view of China’s SOE reforms in the past three decades. The 
plausibility of certain common fears about Chinese SOEs is analysed and refuted. Part V 
explores policy implications for host countries in handling foreign investment by Chinese 
SOEs and China’s ongoing SOE reforms. Part VI concludes. 
10 Industry Canada, Guidelines – Investment by State-owned Enterprises – Net Benefit Analysis, 
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html#p2; Stikeman Elliott, Investment Canada Act: 
SOE Guidelines and CNOOC/Nexen, http://www.stikeman.com/cps/rde/xchg/se-en/hs.xsl/17141.htm. 
11 Madelaine Mackenzie et al., Bill C-60: A More Restrictive Approach to Foreign State-owned Enterprises 
Investment in Canada (June 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=54765cc9-2869-4eb2-
bb2b-7bf3bc1772b8. 
12 Snell & Wilmer LLP, China under the Microscope: The Role of CFIUS in Chinese Acquisitions of U.S. 
Assets, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/china-under-the-microscope-the-role-of-72836/. 
13 Sudeep Reddy, Failed US Deals Stir Tensions with China, Wall St. J. (18 Oct. 2012); Tess Fitzgerald, 
Chinese FDI in the US: Beyond the Smoke Screen, AmCham China News (18 Jul. 2011). 
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2 EXPLAINING CHINA’S OFDI: MOTIVATIONS, POLICY 
INCENTIVES AND CONCERNS 
2.1 DRIVERS OF CHINA’S OFDI 
The conventional wisdom holds that in China’s highly controlled economic system, the 
policy and strategy of the Chinese government have been always among the most 
significant determinants in explaining the development of China’s OFDI. 14  This 
observation however does not mean that China’s OFDI policy is not rooted in China’s 
economic reality. Indeed, the rapid growth of Chinese OFDI is a result of Chinese 
economic necessity.15 
First, over the last thirty years, policies aiming at promoting export growth have 
allowed China to accumulate mammoth foreign exchange reserves, nearly USD 3.95 
trillion in the first quarter of 2014. 16 China’s sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and its 
central bank act as portfolio investors, buying bonds such as US Treasury securities. 
These investments, however, bear low interest rates and China has been seeking 
alternative channels to diversify its investment and realize higher returns.17 The vast 
foreign exchange reserves also give pressure on China to achieve equilibrium in its 
international financial flows by revaluing its currency the Renminbi.18 While China has 
been gradually making its foreign exchange regime more flexible and the Renminbi has 
appreciated 34% against the US dollar since 2005, adjustments would not be enough to 
starve off the revaluation pressure effectively.19 In the meantime, a policy of encouraging 
capital outflows including OFDI would help reduce the currency pressure by partially 
offsetting vigorous capital inflows to China. 
14 OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews- China 2008: Encouraging Responsible Business Conduct, 66 
(OECD Publishing, 2008). 
15 Daniel H. Rosen and Thilo Hanemann, China’s Changing Outbound Foreign Direct Investment Profile: 
Drivers and Policy Implications, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief PB09-14 (June 
2009), at 7. 
16  Josh Nobel, China’s Foreign Exchange Reserves near Record $4tn, Financial Times (15 Apr, 2014).   
17 Salidjanova, supra n. 2, at 14. 
18 Jingtao Yi, China’s Rapid Accumulation of Foreign Exchange Reserves and Its Policy Implications, 10 
University of Nottingham China Policy Institute Brief Series (2006), at 6. 
19 C Fred Bergsten and Joseph E. Gagnon, Currency Manipulation, US Economy and the Global Economic 
Order, Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief PB12-25 (December 2012), at 6. 
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Second, massive domestic investment, rapid urbanization and production for domestic 
and foreign consumption have given rise to an unprecedented demand for resources such 
as oil, iron ore, copper and aluminum.20 Presently, China is consuming more than 25% of 
the world’s total annual production of minerals. Over the past two decades, China has 
moved from being the largest oil exporter in East Asia to becoming the world’s second 
largest importer of oil. It is also forecasted that China’s dependence on foreign oil and 
gas will rise from 51.2% and 5.8% in 2008 to 60% and 30% in 2015, and continue to be 
up to 70% and 50% in 2030.21 This huge demand cannot be met by China’s limited 
domestic deposits of most resources and China faces severe shortage in key raw 
materials.22 China therefore must build trade linkages with Australia, Canada, Russia, 
Brazil and other resource-rich countries to secure long-term supplies. Against this 
background, it is unsurprising that energy exploitation and development have consistently 
been the prime locus of China’ OFDI, accounting for 70% of the total value from 2005–
2013.23 
Third, in a competitive global market where the gains from increasing the scale of 
production have played out, external consumer demand growth is flat, and lower-wage 
countries are increasing taking market share at the lower end, many Chinese enterprises 
are aware of the need to shift their strategy from one of competing on low cost and 
aggressive pricing to one of competing on innovation, brand image and services with 
higher profit margin.24 By targeting distribution networks, retail, management, state-of-
the-art technologies and foreign brands, Chinese firms can ‘leapfrog’ several stages of 
development, without incurring large expenses on R&D, international marketing 
campaigns and development of an overseas customer base.25 
Fourth, Chinese firms face fierce competition in domestic markets. In the face of 
saturated domestic market and falling profit margins, Chinese enterprises have been 
20 Daniel H. Rosen and Trevor Houser, China Energy: A Guide for the Perplexed, China Balance Sheet 
Project Paper, 6–14 (May 2007). 
21 Wensheng Cao and Christoph Bluth, Challenges and Countermeasures of China’s Energy Security, 53 
Energy Policy 381, 384 (2013). 
22 Ibid. 
23 Zhang Yuzhe, China’s OFDI Hits New Record, http://finance.caixin.com/2013-10-16/100592439.html. 
24 OECD, supra n. 14, at 98. 
25 Salidjanova, supra n. 2, at 8. 
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forced to turn to overseas markets and establish production bases outside China.26 In 
addition, OFDI has the benefit of helping Chinese enterprises circumvent international 
trade barriers erected by foreign countries. The successful expansion of Chinese exports 
has been causing protectionist reaction in many countries. Statistics show that China has 
been the world’s biggest victim of anti-dumping investigations since 1995 and also the 
most targeted in anti-subsidy investigations since 2006.27 In addition, the mushrooming 
of bilateral and regional trade agreements may have trade-diversion effects on China’s 
otherwise competitive exports. 28  Therefore, OFDI at appropriate locations can help 
Chinese companies to secure stable and preferential market access to the targeted 
markets. 
2.2 GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR OFDI IN CHINA 
Soon after the launch of the ‘Go Global’ strategy in 2000, the Chinese government has 
begun a gradual liberalization of the OFDI regulatory regime. The process comprised 
multiple prongs, including decentralization of investment verification and approval at the 
provincial level, relaxation of foreign exchange controls, and stimulus packages to ease 
the transition of Chinese companies onto the world stage.29 
To begin with, the Chinese government has continuously reduced the number of stages 
enterprises have to go through for examination and approval of outward investment 
projects. Prior to July 2004, all international investments larger than US Dollars (USD) 1 
million required approval from both the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). The authorities would examine 
detailed information on the commercial value, the financing arrangements, and even the 
technical aspects of each proposed transaction. 30  In July 2004, the State Council 
decentralized the approval authority of OFDI projects to the provincial level with both 
26 John Wong and Sarah Chan, China’s outbound Direct Investment: Expanding Worldwide, 1 (2) China: An 
Intl. J. 273, 284 (2003). 
27 Li Jiabao, Trade Cases against China on the Rise, China Daily (18 Dec. 2012). 
28 Peter Van den Bossche & Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization 651 (3rd 
ed., Cambridge U. Press 2013). 
29 Cristelle Maurin and Pichamon Yeophantong, Going Global Responsibly? China’s Strategies towards 
‘Sustainable’ Overseas Investments, 86 Pacific Affairs 281, 283 (2013). 
30 OECD, supra n. 14, at 88. 
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the NDRC and the MOFCOM.31 The projects in the natural resources category with a 
total investment of less than USD 30 million and projects in other categories less than 
USD 10 million are now approved by the Development and Reform Commission at 
provincial level.32 The projects with a total investment of more than USD 10 million but 
less than USD 100 million are approved by the provincial-level MOFCOM. 33  The 
application procedures and materials required were also simplified and time taken for 
authorization shortened. 34  In a new round of reforms, the NDRC proposed that the 
threshold for the central-level NDRC examination and approval of OFDI projects in the 
natural resources category be raised from USD 30 million to USD 300 million, while the 
threshold for other categories of OFDI projects be raised from USD 10 million to USD 
100 million. 35  It is also reported that relevant government authorities are actively 
studying proposals to further simplify the OFDI regulatory system in the near future.36 
In parallel, the Chinese government has gradually liberalized the restrictions on the use 
of foreign exchanges for OFDI purposes.37 The authority of scrutinizing the legitimacy of 
foreign exchange use for OFDI projects up to a certain size has been decentralized to the 
local-level branches of State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The long-
imposed quota of USD 5 billion per annum on foreign exchange allocation for OFDI was 
eliminated in 2006. Compulsory repatriation of overseas profits back to China and the 
deposit required to guarantee remittance of overseas profits have been abolished.38 In 
2009, the SAFE removed the requirement for an early-stage review and companies now 
31 The State Council, Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Investment System (16 Jul. 2004). 
32 NDRC, Interim Measures for the Administration of Examination and Approval of the Overseas 
Investment Project (19 Oct. 2004). 
33 MOFCOM, Measures for Overseas Investment Management (4 Mar. 2009). 
34 Huang Wenbi and Andreas Wilkes, Analysis of Chinese Overseas Investment Policies, Centre of 
International Forestry Research Working Paper 79 (2011), at 11. 
35 NDRC, Measures for the Administration of Examination and Approval of the Overseas Investment 
Project (Comments-seeking version, 16 Aug. 2012). 
36 Liu Yuxing, The Examination and Approval of Enterprises’ OFDI will be Drastically Reduced, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20130417/173015180837.shtml. 
37 Wei Shen, Is SAFE Safe now? – Foreign Exchange Regulatory Control over Chinese Outbound and 
Inbound Investments and a Political Economy Analysis of Policies, 11 (2) J. World Inv. & Trade 227, 235 
(2010). 
38 OECD, supra n. 14, at 84. 
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only need to lodge a record with the SAFE when making transfers of foreign 
exchanges.39 All these policies have helped boost Chinese companies’ OFDI flows. 
The Chinese government has also offered a range of financial and non-financial 
incentives to support the overseas expansion of Chinese enterprises. The financial support 
takes a number of different forms, including access to loans below market rates, 
government special funds, direct capital contribution and subsidies associated with the 
official aid programs. 40  For example, to encourage and support Chinese companies 
engaging in overseas resources investment and economic and technical cooperation, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the MOFCOM allocated special funds to reimburse 
Chinese companies’ pre-investment costs in 2004. Eligible projects included oil resources 
and metal resources. In 2005, a supplementary circular expanded the scope of eligible 
projects and simplified the funding application procedures.41 In 2011, the MOF and the 
MOFCOM continued to allocate special funds to support certain OFDI projects.42 
Other than funds from government ministries, two policy banks, the China 
Development Bank (CDB) and the China Export and Import Bank (Exim Bank) are 
major providers of financial incentives.43 For example, the NDRC and the Exim Bank 
jointly announced in 2004 that the Exim Bank would earmark a portion of its budget for 
OFDI projects supported by the Chinese government with at least a 2% interest rate 
discount and possibly other preferential lending terms. The MOF will cover the gap 
between the actual market rate and the subsidized rate offered by the Exim Bank.44 In 
2009, the CDB supported the Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE to 
open up to the overseas market. Huawei received USD 30 billion to reduce its cost of 
capital and offer financing to its buyers. ZTE Corporation received a USD 15 billion 
39 SAFE, Regulations on Foreign Exchange Administration of Overseas Direct Investments by Domestic 
Companies (13 Jul. 2009). 
40 OECD, supra n. 14, at 90. 
41 Huang & Wilkes, supra n. 34, at 12. 
42 MOF and MOFCOM, Notice of Application of the 2011 Special Funds of Foreign Economic and 
Technology Cooperation (April 2011). 
43 See generally Erica Downs, China’s Superbank: Debt, Oil and Influence, How China Development Bank 
Is Re-writing the Rules of Global Finance (John Wily & Sons, 2013). 
44 NDRC and Exim Bank, Circular on the Supportive Credit Policy on Key Overseas Investment Project 
Encouraged by the State (October 2004). 
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credit line from the CDB and USD 10 billion from the Exim Bank.45 Not only the policy 
banks, but also major state-owned commercial banks have been active in extending loans 
to OFDI projects in response to the Chinese government’s ‘Go Global’ policy. For 
example, in its bid for Unocal, CNOOC borrowed USD 6 billion from the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China, a Chinese state-owned commercial bank. Another USD 7 
billion came in the form of subsidized loans from CNOOC’s government-owned parent 
company. For the USD 7 billion loan, USD 2.5 billion was interest-free for two years 
with the potential to remain that way for up to thirty years; interest on the remaining USD 
4.5 billion could be waived by the parent company in the event that CNOOC’s credit 
rating dropped below investment grade.46 
Non-financial support includes information services such as investing country 
guidance. For example, the MOFCOM provides information on sectors that are 
encouraged by recipient countries, on common problems encountered in overseas 
investment and on investment-related laws, taxation policies and market conditions of 
recipient countries.47 The Chinese government points out that its regulation of overseas 
investment is not intended to control the scope and direction of these investment, but to 
strengthen macroeconomic guidance. The key policy of ‘government guidance, enterprise 
decision-making’ is necessary because Chinese enterprises have only been taking part in 
international competition for a short time and lack experience. 48  Increasingly, the 
emphasis in OFDI policies is on risk reduction rather than various forms of 
encouragement and targeting, while avoiding excessive interventionism.49 
2.3 CONCERNS ABOUT CHINESE SOES’ GLOBAL EXPANSION 
45 Alessandro Provaggi, China Development Bank’s Financing Mechanisms: Focus on Foreign Investment, 
Stanford Global Projects Centre (May 2013), at 3. 
46 Gary Hufbauer et al., Investment Subsidies for Cross-border M&A: Trends and Policy Implications, 
United States Council Foundation Occasional Paper No. 2 (April 2008), at 2; Thomas P. Holt, CNOOC- 
UNOCAL and the WTO: Discriminatory Rules in the China Accession Protocol is a Latent Threat to the 
Rule of Law in Dispute Settlement Understanding, 15 Pac. Rim L. & Policy J. 457, 458 (2006). 
47 For example, MOFCOM and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Circular of Distributing Industrial Guidance 
Catalogue of Investment to Foreign Countries (August 2004). 
48 Jiang Guocheng, Privately-Owned Enterprises ‘Going Global’ Possess Unique Competitive Advantages 
and Significant Implications, http://www.gov.cn/zwhd/2012-08/08/content_2200600.htm. 
49 Ken Davis, China Investment Policy: An Update, OECD working paper on International Investment 
(2013/01), at 39. 
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The meteoric rise of OFDI by Chinese SOEs presents to host countries a vexing policy 
dilemma. On one hand, the influx of foreign capital would bring much-needed new 
capital and job growth that would have positive economic and political ramifications to 
host countries. On the other hand, foreign SOEs’ investment can raise some genuine 
concerns.50 The first key argument against Chinese SOEs is that they could choose to 
make investment and corporate decisions on political and strategic rather than 
commercial and market considerations.51 Chinese SOEs may effectively serve as ‘Trojan 
horses’, through which the Chinese government may acquire increasing power and 
influence abroad, and potentially engage in other actions such as obtaining access to 
sensitive information or technology and even commercial and state espionage. This will 
jeopardize the national security, energy security and economic security of a host 
country.52 One example frequently cited to illustrate this type of risk was the Russian 
energy giant Gazprom’s decision to cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in early 2006. The 
episode was characterized as driven by the Kremlin’s desire to demonstrate its 
dissatisfaction with policies emanating from Kiev.53 
Second, in most instances, SOEs enjoy government-created subsidies, privileges and 
immunities that are not available to their privately owned competitors.54 These privileges 
give SOEs a competitive advantage over their rivals.55 This raises concerns that SOEs 
may cause market distortions in host countries because such subsidies may facilitate the 
allocation of scarce resources to inefficient or less efficient producers, and SOEs can 
afford to operate and survive regardless of the economic conditions or their market 
50 OECD, Foreign Government- Controlled Investors and Recipient Country Investment Policies: A 
Scoping Paper (2009), at 7. 
51 Elizabeth J Drake, Chinese State-owned and State-controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing 
Chinese State-owned Enterprises, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (15 Feb. 2012); See also Christopher Cox, The Role of Government in Markets, Keynote 
Address and Robert R. Glauber Lecture at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University 
(24 Oct. 2007). 
52 David N. Fagan, The U.S. Regulatory and Institutional Framework for FDI, Investing in the United 
States: A Reference Series for Chinese Investors (Vol. 2, 2008), at 20; Andreas Lunding, Global Champ  
ion in Waiting: Perspectives on China’s Overseas Direct Investment, Deutsche Bank Research Paper ( 
August 2006), at 5. 
53 Alan P. Larson & David M. Marchick, National Security and Foreign Investment: Getting the Balance 
Right, Council of Foreign Relations No. 18 (July 2006), at 21. 
54 Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in 
China, Report to U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2011), at 58. 
55 OECD, Competitive Neutrality in the Presence of State Owned Enterprises, DAF/CA/PRIV(2010)1 (2 
Apr. 2010), at 6. 
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behavior. The playing field between SOEs and privately owned enterprises in both the 
domestic market and global market is tilted in favour of the former.56 Indeed, much of the 
public criticism of Chinese SOEs’ takeover bids has focused on the perception that the 
bids were facilitated by the subsidized financing from the Chinese government.57 
Third, Chinese SOEs’ OFDI spree has caused reciprocity concerns. Senator Charles 
Schumer of New York for instance  demanded that when any SOE sought to acquire an 
American company, an additional study be performed on trade reciprocity. 58  China 
currently runs a far more restrictive FDI regime than many other countries.59 Foreign 
companies are likely to face limits to access in China when such access potentially harms 
financial interests of Chinese SOEs or contradicts the interests of the Chinese 
government.60 If the Chinese government would not approve similar investment projects 
made by foreign investors in China, critics argue that such projects launched by Chinese 
investors should not be approved by host countries. 
Fourth, there are also concerns relating to China’s OFDI in economically 
disadvantaged regions such as Africa and Latin America. The economic, social, and 
environmental framework within which Chinese companies operate is different from – 
and inferior to – the best-practice standards that the major established Western companies 
typically maintain. As a consequence, there is a risk that individual host countries in the 
developing world may be exposed to ‘Resource Curse’ practices of illicit payments, graft, 
and corruption, plus poor worker treatment and lax environmental standards.61 
Finally, a deeper cause of concern is the inherent suspicion in some Western countries 
that foreign state capital is a threat to the free market at home. This is especially the case 
for countries where recently privatized corporate entities face competition or the prospect 
56 Price, supra n. 9, at 12. 
57 Fagan, supra n. 52, at 19. 
58 John Bussey, Playing Hardball with Chinese Investors, Wall St. J. (25 Oct. 2012). 
59 OECD 2012 FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/ColumnChart-
FDI_RR_Index_2012.pdf. 
60 Szamosszegi & Kyle, supra n. 54, at 84. 
61 Barbara Kotschwar et al., Chinese Investment in Latin America Resources: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly, Peterson Institute for International Economics Working Paper 12-3 (February 2012), at 2. Namukale 
Chintu and Peter J. Williamson, Chinese State-owned Enterprises in Africa: Myths and Realities, Global 
Business (April 2013). 
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of takeover by foreign SOE rivals. Where doubts linger about the commercial and 
financial autonomy of the foreign SOEs this situation has repeatedly led to concerns 
about ‘renationalization’ of national champions through a foreign government.62 In a 
statement that made clear the Canadian government’s antipathy towards SOEs, Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper stated in 2012: 
All investments are not equal… purchases of Canadian assets by foreign governments through 
state-owned enterprises are not the same as other transactions…To be blunt, Canadians have not 
spent years reducing the ownership of sectors of the economy by our own governments, only to 
see them bought and controlled by foreign governments instead.63 
According to a 2008 survey in Australia, more Australians are opposed to foreign 
ownership of major Australian companies than the death penalty, the Iraq war, or even 
‘illegal immigration’. Importantly, 85% of respondents felt that companies controlled by 
foreign governments should be more strictly regulated than foreign private investors, with 
the most opposition (78%) directed at companies controlled by China.64 These concerns 
could fuel sentiment of economic nationalism and draw states into a downward spiral of 
protectionism. Such a scenario would have disastrous consequences for the global 
economy. 
3 REGULATORY RESPONSES 
The principle of sovereignty in international law gives states ample leeway to prevent 
foreign investors from taking over domestic companies. This freedom may be restricted 
by bilateral investment treaties (BITs). However, an overview of the BITs shows that 
these treaties largely focus on the question of the extent to which cross-border 
investments are protected once they have been made, for example, against arbitrary 
expropriation. 65  Even though some recent BITs extend the principles of national 
treatment and most favoured nation treatment to the pre-entry phase of the investment, 
countries undertaking such commitments regularly include reservations and exemptions 
62 OECD, SOEs Operating Abroad: An Application of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises to the Cross-border Operations of SOEs, 4–5 (2010). 
63 State by the Prime Minister of Canada on Foreign Investment (7 Dec. 2012), 
http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?category=3&featureId=6&pageId=49&id=5195. 
64 Megan Bowman, Australian Foreign Investment Policy: Fertile Soil or Shifting Ground?, 
http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/compliance/mergers-%26-acquisitions/australian-foreign-investment-
policy-fertile-soil-or-shifting-ground. 
65 Andreas Heinemann, Government Control of Cross-Border M&A: Legitimate Regulation or 
Protectionism, 15(3) J. Int’l. Econ. L. 843, 855 (2012). 
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with respect to certain sectors.66 In addition, exceptions for the protection of national 
security are often added and they are exempted from the dispute settlement process 
provided in the treaty.67 As a result, host countries keep control over the admission of 
foreign investment, including the power to protect strategic sectors and pursue industrial 
policy.68 
Various concerns about Chinese SOEs’ OFDI sparked heated policy debate in host 
countries. In response, several countries have recently clarified or strengthened their 
investment policies regarding investment from foreign SOEs. 
3.1 US 
Unlike some countries that apply an economic interest test when reviewing foreign 
investment such as Canada and Australia, the regulatory focus of the US foreign 
investment law is on the potential impact of the proposed foreign investment on national 
security. In the US, the Exon-Florio Amendment of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Exon-Florio) represented the first time that the US 
possessed a system devoted to the vetting of foreign investment when it affects national 
security.69 The passage of the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 
(FINASA) further overhauled the Exon-Florio process. 70  The authority to administer 
FINASA rests with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 
an inter-agency committee including the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Homeland 
Security, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Labour and others. As a result of a CFIUS review, 
the President could suspend or prohibit any acquisition if he has credible evidence 
showing that the transaction threatens to impair national security.71 
66 For example, Art. 3 of the US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. 
67 UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995–2006: Trends in Investment Rulemaking, 142 (New York 
and Geneva 2007); See also UNCTAD, supra n. 4, at 87. 
68 Heinemann, supra n. 65, at 853. 
69 Section 721 Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended by section 5021 of the United States Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States 
International Investment Obligation in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 Va. J. Int’l. L. 1 (1989); 
Joseph Mamounas, Controlling Foreign Ownership of U.S. Strategic Assets: The Challenge of Maintaining 
National Security in a Globalized and Oil Independent World, 13 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 381, 388 (2007). 
70 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49 (26 Jul. 2007). 
71 Ibid., s. 6. 
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FINASA requires CFIUS to review all ‘covered’ foreign investment transactions to 
determine whether a transaction threatens to impair the national security, or the foreign 
entity is controlled by a foreign government, or it would result in control of any ‘critical 
infrastructure’ that could impair the national security.72 A ‘covered’ foreign investment 
transaction is defined as any merger, acquisition or takeover ‘which could result in 
foreign control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States’.73 
According to the US Treasury Department, ‘control’ means the power to determine, 
direct, take, reach or cause decisions regarding important matters affecting an entity, no 
matter whether or not exercised and how it is excised. By contrast, investments 
undertaken solely for the purpose of investment, i.e. investments in which the foreign 
investor has no intention of directing the basic business decision of the issuing company, 
such as an investment of no more than 10% of the voting securities of the firm, are not 
reviewable transactions.74 
The CFIUS review consists of three distinct parts: a voluntary notification to CFIUS 
and a thirty-day review; a forty-five-day investigation period for those transactions that 
raise national security concerns during the thirty-day review; and a fifteen-day 
presidential determination stage.75 Though voluntary, foreign firms saw it as in their best 
interest to submit to the CFIUS review early. This is because FINSA has no statute of 
limitations, meaning that reviews and investigations could be conducted on deals 
concluded long ago where no approval had been obtained.76 Unlike comparable review 
processes in Japan and France, a CFIUS decision is not subject to judicial review.77 
The exact meaning of ‘national security’ was not clearly defined. It was purposefully 
left ambiguous, in theory giving the President flexibility to deal with future and as yet 
72 Ibid., s. (2) (b) (2) (B). 
73 Ibid., s. (2) (a) (3). 
74 See Department of the Treasury, Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers by 
Foreign Persons, RIN 1505-AB88 (18 Nov. 2008). 
75 James K. Jackson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), Congressional 
Research Service 7-5700, 11–12 (16 Sep. 2012). 
76 See Edward M. Graham & David M. Marchick, U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct Investment 
(Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2006), at 37. 
77 Jonathan Masters, Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security, Council on Foreign Relations 




                                                          
unforeseen threats.78 Previously CFIUS was directed to focus its review on the potential 
impact of foreign investment on the US national defense security and only five factors 
need to be considered. Now FINASA includes a list of twelve factors that CFIUS must 
consider. The additional factors include the potential effects on ‘critical infrastructure’ 
and ‘critical technologies’ and ‘the long-term projection of the US requirements for 
sources of energy and other critical resources and materials’.79 FINSA also vests in 
CFIUS the power to negotiate, enter into, impose, and enforce any agreement or 
condition with any party to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any resulting 
threat to the US national security.80 
At first, Exon-Florio was silent on appropriate actions that CFIUS may take with 
regard to investment made by state-controlled entities. This weakness was arguably 
revealed in the CATIC-MAMCO transaction in 1989. In November 1989, the state-
owned Chinese National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) 
acquired the American Corporation MAMCO, a producer of metal parts for civilian 
aircraft, for USD 5 million. After determining that MAMCO was in possession of 
technology that was subject to export controls, President George H. W. Bush ordered 
CATIC to divest itself of its new American subsidiary.81 Though a seemingly simple 
exercise of presidential authority, the MAMCO episode was marked by confusion and an 
ad hoc approach to the definition of national security. It was unclear what threat, if any, 
CATIC’s control of MAMCO actually posed to American national security. Most 
arguments against the deal boiled down to the fact that CATIC was essentially an arm of 
the Chinese government.82 
The Congress amended Exon-Florio and enacted the Byrd Amendment in 1993. The 
Byrd Amendment imposed a mandatory forty-five-day investigation for transactions 
involving foreign government-controlled firms which ‘could affect’ national security, 
arguably establishing a broader standard than the previous one, which encompassed only 
78 Deborah M. Mostaghel, Dubai Ports World under Exon-Florio: A Threat to National Security or a 
Tempest in a Seaport?, 70 Albany L. Rev. 583, 592–593 (2007). 
79 FINASA, s. 4. 
80 Ibid., s. 5. 
81 Jim Mendenhall, United States: Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions under the Exon-Florio 
Amendment- The MAMCO Divestiture, 32 Harv. Int’l L. J. 286, 290 (1991). 
82 Mostaghel, supra n. 78, at 600. 
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transactions that ‘threaten to impair’ national security.83 Unlike the Byrd Amendment, 
which still allowed some leeway in its mandatory investigation, FINSA now expands on 
the Byrd Amendment’s mandate and requires CFIUS to investigate all foreign investment 
deals where the overseas entity is owned or controlled by a foreign government.84 Some 
argued that this change shifted the burden of proof from CFIUS to foreign firms to show 
that they do not present a national security threat.85 
Since its creation, Exon-Florio has been criticized as a potential tool of economic 
protectionism. 86  The vague standards and lack of transparency rendered the review 
process easily abused to discriminate against foreign investors.87 In recent years, the 
politicization of the Exon-Florio review has emerged as an even greater threat to foreign 
investors in the US.88 Factors external to both the transaction and national security were 
frequently taken into consideration when making final decisions. Consequently, rather 
than addressing national security concerns, unrestricted political interference based on 
political gamesmanship and economic protectionism result in a chilling effect on 
potential foreign investment to the US.89 The alleged victims of the politically charged 
national security review process are Chinese SOEs and even Chinese private enterprises 
which are suspected to have close connections with the Chinese government.90 
The failed attempt to acquire Unocal by CNOOC in 2005 was a case in point. As one 
of the three majority state-owned petroleum companies in China, CNOOC made an 
unsolicited all-cash offer of USD 18.5 billion to Unocal, an oil company based in 
California, through a Hong Kong subsidiary CNOOC Ltd. CNOOC Ltd provided a 
number of highly attractive terms in its bid, including a willingness to divest certain parts 
83 Ibid., at 601. 
84 FINASA, section 2 (b) (2) (B) (i) (II). 
85 Master, supra n. 77. 
86 Thomas W. Soseman, The Exon-Florio Amendment to the 1988 Trade Bill: A Guardian of National 
Security or a Protectionist Weapon?, 15 J. Corp. L. 597, 611 (1990). 
87 Stanley Lubman, China’s State Capitalism: The Real World Implications, Wall St. J., (1 Mar. 2012); Paul 
Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N. C. L. Rev. 83, 117 (2008); Henry J. Graham, Foreign Investment 
Laws of China and the United States: A Comparative Study, 5 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’ Y 253, 257–258 
(1996). 
88 Rose, supra n. 87, at 130. See Graham & Marchick, supra n. 76, at 123. 
89 Yiheng Feng, We Wouldn’t Transfer Title to the Devil: Consequences of the Congressional Politicization 
of Foreign Direct Investment on National Security Grounds, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 253, 255 (2009). 
90 Fagan, supra n. 52, at 18–21. 
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of Unocal if necessary as well as a willingness to retain substantially all existing Unocal 
personnel.91 This latter concession stood in stark contrast to another bidder, Chevron, 
who offered USD 16.5 billion mixed cash and stock and announced plans to exact 
hundreds of millions of dollars of cost savings, likely by implementing layoffs. 92 
However, reaction to CNOOC’s bid on the floor of Congress was intense. Displeased at 
the thought of a Chinese-owned American oil subsidiary, the House first called for a 
thorough presidential review of the transaction, then cut off funding to CFIUS prohibiting 
the use of treasury funds to approve any deal between CNOOC and Unocal, and finally 
made it practically impossible for CNOOC to present its offer to Unocal shareholders 
before their vote in time.93 CNOOC finally abandoned the acquisition. 
Viewing the facts, it could be strongly argued that the congressional reaction was 
severely out of proportion when compared to the actual importance of Unocal for 
American energy needs. By 2005, Unocal was no longer a major player in the energy 
industry. In 2004, the year before the transaction, Unocal produced only about 1% of the 
US natural gas consumption.94 It possessed no refineries in the US and its most valuable 
assets were located primarily overseas, which was the primary reason why CNOOC 
found it so attractive in the first place. To assuage the national security concerns, 
CNOOC had announced its willingness to divest itself of Unocal’s American holdings.95 
In light of these facts, the congressional description of the CNOOC-Unocal deal as a 
threat to ‘vital US energy assets’ was a mischaracterization at best and pure hyperbole at 
worst. 96  Starting from CNOOC’ unsuccessful bid in 2005, a series of attempted 
acquisitions by Chinese investors in US failed to pass muster the national security 
review.97 Most recently, President Obama ordered the China-based Ralls Corp to divest 
four Oregon wind farms it had previously acquired from Innovative Renewable Energy 
91 CNOOC Ltd. Press Release, CNOOC Limited Proposes Merger with Unocal Offering USD 67 Per 
Unocal Share in Cash (23 Jun. 2005), http://www.cnoocltd.com/encnoocltd/newszx/news/2005/957.shtml. 
92 Holt, supra n. 46, at 474. 
93 Feng, supra n. 89, at 276. 
94 Dick K. Nanto et al., China and the CNOOC Bid for Unocal: Issues for Congress, CRS Report for 
Congress (2005), at 9. 
95 CNOOC Ltd. Press Release, CNOOC Limited Proposes Merger with Unocal Offering USD $67 Per 
Unocal Share in Cash (23 Jun. 2005). 
96 Joshua W. Casselman, China’s Latest ‘Threat’ to the United States: The Failed CNOOC-Unocal Merger 
and its Implications for Exon-Florio and CFIUS, 17 Ind. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 155 (2007). 
97 Snell & Wilmer LLP, supra n. 12. 
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LLC on September 2012. Ralls Corp sued the US government, including President 
Obama, in the first legal challenge to a CFIUS decision. The US Court of Appeals ruled 
allowing Ralls to obtain evidence on why its bid for Oregon wind farms was rejected. 
However, the ruling did not have a major impact on the actual decision made by CFIUS 
because the court did not rule that CFIUS and Obama had no power to block the Ralls 
Corp deal.98 
Despite the impressive growth in recent years, Chinese investment in the US market 
remains small, especially by comparison to the strong equity investment flows from the 
rest of the world to the US. Nevertheless, the small slice of investment from China has 
attracted the most substantial reviews and objections from CFIUS.99 As a result, Chinese 
firms now frequently cite regulatory and political obstacles against Chinese investment to 
explain their cautious approach to investing in the US.100 
3.2 CANADA 
In Canada, any investment by a non-Canadian investor resulting in the acquisition of 
control of a Canadian business must first receive approval of the federal Minister of 
Industry under the Investment Canada Act (ICA) if the aggregate book value of the assets 
of the Canadian business to be acquired exceeds Canadian Dollars (CAD) 354 million 
(2014 threshold). An acquisition by a non-Canadian of 33.3% or more of the voting rights 
of a Canadian business is presumed to be an acquisition of control unless there is 
evidence to the contrary. By contrast, any acquisition of less than 33.3% is deemed not to 
be an acquisition of control.101 
When a proposed acquisition of control exceeds the asset value threshold, the investor 
must file an application to the Minister of Industry (the Minister) for review. A 
98 Shannon Tiezzi, Chinese Company Wins Court Case against Obama, The Diplomat (17 July 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/chinese-company-wins-court-case-against-obama/ 
99 David M. Marchick, Fostering Greater Chinese Investment in the United States, Council on Foreign 
Relations Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 13 (February 2012). 
100 David F. Gordon, The Competitive Challenges Posed by China’s State-owned Enterprises, Testimony 
before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (15 Feb. 2012); Yu Qiao & Zhang 
Shuqing, Research on External Environment of Chinese Overseas Investment in U.S., Brookings-Tsinghua 
Centre for Public Policy, Policy Report Series (May 2013), at 4. 
101 Section 28(3) of the ICA. 
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reviewable transaction may not be completed until the Minister is satisfied that the 
investment is likely to be of ‘net benefit’ to Canada. In making such an assessment, the 
Minister will take into account six factors: (i) the effect of the investment on the level and 
nature of economic activity in Canada; (ii) the degree and significance of participation by 
Canadians in the Canadian business and in any industry or industries in Canada; (iii) the 
effect of the investment on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological development, 
product innovation and product variety in Canada; (iv) the effect of the investment on 
competition within any industry or industries in Canada; (v) the compatibility of the 
investment with national industrial, economic and cultural policies; and (vi) the 
contribution of the investment to Canada’s ability to compete in world markets.102 
In respect of acquisitions of Canadian businesses by foreign SOEs, the Canadian 
government issued SOE Guidelines in December 2007. The purpose of enacting the SOE 
Guidelines was to clarify the application of the ICA in response to considerable public 
concern over foreign SOEs’ acquisition of prominent Canadian businesses. 103  In 
December 2012 the Canadian government issued the updated SOE Guidelines. In June 
2013, the Economic Action Plan 2013 Act introduced several amendments to the ICA, 
imposing further restrictions on foreign SOEs’ investment in Canada.104 Under the new 
rules, the definition of an SOE is expanded to cover ‘an enterprise that is owned, 
controlled or influenced, directly or indirectly by a foreign government’. An individual 
acting under the direction or influence, directly or indirectly, of a government is also 
covered. Given that the term ‘indirect influence’ is not defined, the Canadian government 
would have greater discretion to label a foreign investor as an SOE. Arguably, such a 
broad definition even covers some Chinese privately owned enterprises if they keep too 
close connections with the Chinese government. 
Not only is the definition of SOE expanded, the revised ICA appears to give the 
Canadian government power to review some SOE-involved transactions that previously 
fell out of its ambit. Under the new rules, the Minister may declare that a proposed 
acquisition by a foreign SOE is an acquisition in control in fact, even where the 33.3% 
102 Section 20 of the ICA. 
103 Industry Canada, supra n. 10. 
104 Elliott, supra n. 10. 
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threshold is not met, if the Minster is satisfied that the entity is under the control of one or 
more of SOEs after considering ‘any information and evidence’.105 Furthermore, under 
proposed amendments, the review threshold is to progressively increase to CAD$1 
billion.  However, the review threshold for SOE investments will be amended such that 
the existing CAD 354M threshold will remain in place.106  . 
When making the ‘net benefit’ assessment involving a foreign SOE acquirer, the 
Minister must be satisfied with the proposed investment’s: (i) commercial orientation; (ii) 
freedom from political influence; (iii) adherence to Canadian laws, standards and 
practices that promote sound corporate governance and transparency including, for 
example, independent members of the board, independent audit committees, and 
equitable treatment of shareholders; (iv) commitment to Canadian laws and practices and 
(v) positive contributions to the productivity and industrial efficiency of the Canadian 
business.108 Pursuant to the SOE Guidelines, the Minister will examine how and the 
extent to which the non-Canadian is owned and controlled by the foreign government. 
Foreign SOEs are required to identify their controller, including any direct or indirect 
state ownership or control, and address the inherent characteristics of SOEs, specifically 
that they are susceptible to state influence. The burden of proof is on foreign SOEs to 
demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Minister that proposed investments are likely to be 
of ‘net benefit’ to Canada.109 
The acquiring SOEs are encouraged to submit specific undertakings relating to certain 
aspects of the business, including the appointment of Canadians as independent directors; 
the employment of Canadians in senior management positions; the incorporation of 
business in Canada; and the listing of shares of the acquiring company or the Canadian 
business being acquired on a Canadian stock exchange.110 These undertakings have been  
actively enforced by the Canadian government.111 The recent transactions showed that 
105 Section 28(6) of the ICA. 
106 Oliver J. Borgers and Michele Siu, Is net Benefit to Canada Different for State-owned Enterprises 
Investments (31 July 2014), http://www.canadianenergylawblog.com/2014/07/31/is-net-benefit-to-canada-
different-for-state-owned-enterprise-investments/ 
108 Industry Canada, supra n. 10. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 United States Steel Corporation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 176, affirming 2010 FC 642 
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foreign SOEs have made commitments mirroring the examples in the SOE Guidelines.112 
Under the ICA, undertakings are monitored and usually have duration of three to five 
years. However, in the case of an investment by an SOE, undertaking relating to 
corporate governance and commercial orientation will survive for as long as the SOE 
controls the Canadian business.113 
Except the ‘net benefit’ assessment, the ICA also has a national security review 
procedure. In September 2009, the ICA was amended, authorizing that if the Minister has 
reasonable grounds to believe that an investment by a non-Canadian could be injurious to 
national security, the federal Governor in Council has power to review and prohibit such 
investment, regardless of its size. The term ‘national security’ is not defined in the Act or 
the regulations thereunder and there has been no formal guidance issued in relation to 
what constitutes an investment that could be injurious to national security. However, the 
Canadian government does not presume that an investment by an SOE, even in the 
natural resources sectors, will necessarily give rise to national security issues and a 
number of recent acquisitions involving SOEs have not involved national security 
reviews.114 
After a furry of amendments of laws and guidelines, SOEs will likely face a 
substantially changed foreign investment review regime in Canada. The Prime Minister 
announced in 2012 that no more takeovers of oil sands operations by foreign SOEs would 
be approved unless on an exceptional basis. The enhanced discretion to review and block 
investment by SOEs introduced in recent amendments signaled the Canadian 
government’s general antipathy to public sector involvement in the private sector.115 
(leave to appeal to the SCC denied). 
112 For example, CNOOC’s acquisition of Nexen in 2012. CNOOC Ltd. Press Release, CNOOC Limited 
Receives Industry Canada Approval on Its Proposed Acquisition of Nexen Inc (8 Dec. 2012). 
113 Brian A. Facey and Joshua A. Krane, Investing in Canada: Strategic Considerations for State-owned 
Enterprises during a Fragile Economic Recovery (June 2012), 
http://www.blakesfiles.com/pdf/JOK/Investing_in_Canada_Strategic_Considerations_for_State_Owned_En
terprises_during_a_Fragile_Economic_Recovery.pdf. 
114 Omar Wakil & Phil Mohtadi, Recent Developments in National Security Reviews of Foreign Investments 
in Canada, 4 ABA International Antitrust Bulletin (2009), at 10. 





                                                                                                                                                                             
3.3 AUSTRALIA 
In Australia, the regulatory framework under which foreign companies can invest in 
Australian businesses comprises the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (the 
Act), the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 1989, and Australia’s Foreign 
Investment Policy (the Policy). Under the current regime, the Foreign Investment Review 
Board (FIRB) reviews foreign investment proposals on a case-by-case basis and makes 
recommendations to the Australian Federal Treasurer. The Treasurer has ultimate 
responsibility for decision-making under Australia’s foreign investment regime and has a 
broad discretion to decline or apply conditions to a proposed investment that he or she 
considers to be against the ‘national interest’.116 
The Policy stipulates that any ‘direct investment’ in Australia by a ‘foreign 
government investor’ is required to notify FIRB and FIRB will review the proposed 
investment. At the same time, both ‘direct investment’ and ‘foreign government investor’ 
are defined widely. Entities in which a foreign government has a direct or indirect 
aggregate interest of 15% or more are considered to be a ‘foreign government investor’. 
‘Direct investment’ is defined as any investment of an interest of 10% or more although it 
may be less than 10% where the acquiring foreign government investor is building a 
strategic stake in the target, or can use that investment to influence or control the 
target.117 Examples include the foreign government investor obtains preferential, special 
or veto voting rights, the ability to appoint directors and contractual rights. These broad 
definitions ensure that all major foreign investment involving Chinese SOEs need to be 
reviewed by FIRB. 
Once a review is triggered, chief consideration is given by FIRB to whether the 
proposed investment will be contrary to the national interest. Despite the obvious 
importance of knowing what the national interest is in order to protect it, the phrase is not 
116 George Gilligan & Megan Bowman, What is the State of Play? The Effects of State Capital Investment 
in Australia and Regulatory Implications, CIFR Working Paper No. 004/2013, at 17; Vivienne Bath, 
Foreign Investment, the National Interest and National Security- Foreign Direct Investment in Australia 
and China, 34 Sydney L. Rev. 5, 14 (2012). 




                                                          
legislatively defined.118 In practice, proposals are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. The 
FIRB considers the impact of the proposed investment on Australia’s national security 
interests, competition, impact on the economy and community, other government policies 
such as tax revenues and environmental impact and the character of the investor.119 
When determining the impact of proposed investment by an SOE on the national 
interest, the proposal is assessed on the same basis as a private sector proposal. However, 
due to the special nature of SOEs, some additional factors will be considered. The key 
consideration is whether the investment is commercial in nature or whether the investor 
may be pursuing broader political or strategic objectives. 120  This includes assessing 
whether the acquiring SOE’s corporate governance arrangement could facilitate actual or 
potential control by a foreign government. Proposed transactions that operate fully at 
arm’s length and on commercial basis are less likely to raise national interest issues. 
Other mitigating factors include the existence of external partners in the investment, 
arrangements to protect Australian interests from non-commercial dealings and whether 
the target will be listed on the Australian securities exchange or other securities 
markets.121 The Treasurer does not necessarily block an investment that is not operating 
fully on commercial basis, but clearly retains full discretion to do so on the grounds of 
‘national interest’. 
In May 2009, Aluminum Corp of China (Chinalco) announced a USD 19.5 billion 
investment for an 18% stake in Rio Tinto, the world’s third-largest miner and owner of 
rich iron-ore and copper mines in Australia and elsewhere. One month later the Rio Tinto 
board withdrew its support amid public debate on the growing level of Chinese 
ownership of Australia’s natural resources. 122  In 2012, The Australian government 
banned the Australian unit of Huawei from tendering for the USD 38 billion National 
Broadband Network contracts.123 The ban was upheld after a review in 2013.124 
118 Bowman, supra n. 64. 
119 Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 2013, at 8. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Dana Cimilluca et al., Rio Tinto Scuttles its Deal with Chinalco, Wall St. J. (5 Jun. 2009). 
123 Gavin Lower and Andrew Critchlow, Huawei Voices Dismay at Australian Network Exclusion, Wall St. 
J. (26 Mar. 2012). 
124 Agence France-Presse, Australia Maintains Ban on Huawei for Broadband Network, South China 
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3.4 EUROPEAN UNION 
Unlike the US which can fend off Chinese takeover bids on national security grounds, the 
EU has not established a similar security review regime.125 Nevertheless, as the trend of 
Chinese companies acquiring European companies has accelerated in recent years, the 
European Commission has strengthened the monitoring of Chinese SOEs’ acquisitions in 
Europe on grounds of competition policy.126 
The applicable law is the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Two conditions must be 
met before the EUMR is applicable to a particular transaction. First, the transaction can 
be qualified as a ‘concentration’, i.e. a number of previously separate undertakings come 
under the control of an undertaking or person on a lasting basis.127 An ‘undertaking’ 
under the EUMR is broadly defined and covers any entity having an economic activity, 
regardless of its legal form and the way in which it is financed.128 An SOE is therefore an 
‘undertaking’ for the purpose of the EUMR. Second, the ‘concentration’ has a European 
Union dimension, i.e. meets the turnover thresholds set out in the EUMR.129  These 
thresholds refer to the turnover achieved by the ‘undertakings concerned’, i.e. the 
undertakings participating in a concentration. In the event that the undertaking concerned 
belongs to a ‘group’, not only its turnover but also the turnover of the group must be 
taken into account for the purpose of assessing whether the turnover thresholds are met. 
The EUMR does not explicitly define the concept of a ‘group’.130 Article 5(4) of the 
EUMR makes reference to a range of rights and powers held by or in an undertaking 
concerned that should be taken into account in turnover calculation. These include 
Morning Post (30 Oct. 2013). 
125 While recognizing that EU Member States may take appropriate measures to protect certain ‘legitimate 
interests’ such as public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules, Member States have rarely 
been successful in blocking foreign acquisition on ‘legitimate interests’ grounds. Angela Huyue Zhang, The 
Single-Entity Theory: An Antitrust Time Bomb for Chinese State-owned Enterprises? 8 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 
805, 807 (2012). 
126 The flows of foreign direct investment coming from China have increased from USD 2.9 billion in 2003 
to USD 10 billion to 2011. See Thilo Hanemann & Daniel H. Rosen, China Invests in Europe: Patterns, 
Impacts and Policy Implications, Rhodium Group Report, 64-5 (June 2012). 
127 Article 3(1) of the EUMR. 
128 Case C-41/90, Hofner and Elserv Macrotron GmbH, 1991 ECR I-1979, at 21. 
129 Article 3(1) of the EUMR. 
130 Paragraph 130 of the Commission’s Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation No. 




                                                                                                                                                                             
owning more than half of the capital or business assets; the power to exercise more than 
half of the voting rights and to appoint more than half of the members of any 
boards/bodies legally representing the undertaking; or the right to manage the 
undertaking’s affairs.131 
Applying the concept of ‘group’ to an SOE is problematic because the relevant group 
would have comprised the state and each and every company in which the state exercises 
control.132 This would have led to an overly wide concept of ‘group’ and practically 
every concentration involving an SOE would have been caught under the EUMR. 
Precisely for this reason, Recital 22 of the EUMR creates an exception to the group 
determination involving SOEs. It states that, in order to respect the principle of non-
discrimination between the public and private sectors, calculation of the turnover of 
undertakings concerned in a concentration needs to take account of undertakings making 
up an economic unit with an independent power of decision, irrespective of the way the 
capital is held or of the rules of administrative supervision applicable to them. 
Therefore, for the purposes of calculating turnover involving SOEs, only those SOEs 
belonging to the same economic unit and having the same independent power of decision 
are to be considered. Paragraph 194 of the Jurisdictional Note reads: 
Thus, where a State-owned company is not subject to any coordination with other State-controlled 
holdings, it should be treated as independent for the purposes of Article 5, and the turnover of 
other companies owned by that State should not be taken into account. Where, however, several 
State-owned companies are under the same independent centre of commercial decision-making, 
then the turnover of those businesses should be considered part of the group of the undertaking 
concerned for the purposes of Article 5. 
In practice, the Commission adopts a two-step approach. First, it analyses whether the 
SOE has an independent power of decision. Second, if this is not the case, it identifies the 
ultimate state entity and which other undertakings owned by this entity need to be 
considered as one economic entity.133 The turnover of that state entity and all other 
undertakings controlled by that entity should be taken into account in calculating 
turnovers of undertakings concerned. Then, how to assess whether an SOE has 
131 Article 5(4) of the EUMR. Paragraph 178 of the ‘Jurisdictional Notice’. 
132 Craig Pouncey and Kyriakos Fountoukakos, Transactions Involving States or State-owned Enterprises, 
Eur. Antitrust Rev. 14 (2013). 
133 Case No COMP/M.6082 – CHINA NATIONAL BLUESTAR/ELKEM (31/03/2011), para.12. 
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independent decision-making power or not? This assessment is guided by the possible 
power of the State to influence the companies’ commercial strategy and the likelihood for 
the State to actually coordinate their commercial conduct, either by imposing or 
facilitating such coordination. 134  In previous cases, the Commission has taken into 
account factors such as the degree of interlocking directorships or the existence of 
adequate safeguards ensuring that commercially sensitive information is not shared 
between such SOEs.135 
Starting from 2011 until 2014, the European Commission applied the EUMR to at least 
twelve takeovers and join venture transactions involving Chinese SOEs.136 One thorny 
issue before the Commission is to assess to what extent the Chinese SOE concerned has 
an independent power of decision from the Chinese State. The answer to this question is 
crucial both to the determination of the jurisdiction of the EUMR and the substantive 
assessment of the competition implications of the proposed concentration. In all these 
cases, the European Commission declined to conclude whether the Chinese SOEs 
involved possess an independent power of decision. The parties explained that the State 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) directly under the State 
Council and regional SASACs only exercise ownership functions on behalf of the State 
as a non-managerial trustee. The limited statutory power of the SASAC prevents it from 
exercising a decisive influence over SOEs under its supervision and that the SASAC does 
not intervene in the strategic decision-making process (e.g. by approving business plans 
or budgets), nor does it interfere in SOEs’ production and operation activities.137 There 
are also no interlocking directorships between central or local SASAC-owned companies. 
In one case, the Commission agreed that there was no evidence showing that the central 
SASAC would be able to align the market behavior of firms under the authority of 
regional SASACs. 138  Still, the Commission relied on several legal provisions, 
information on the SASAC’s website and some external sources as suggesting that the 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
136 Kyriakos Fountoukakos et al., European Commission Seeks Harmonization on Merger Control Reviews 
of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (18 Jul. 2013), http://careers.herbertsmith.com/insights/legal-
briefings?page=25. 
137 Supra n. 132, para. 14. 
138 Ibid., para. 30. 
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SASAC and the Chinese State could influence Chinese SOEs’ commercial behavior 
through formal and informal channels.139 
The Commission was able to avoid the sensitive question in all these cases because 
even the Commission adopted a worst case scenario approach, i.e. taking into account all 
the Chinese SOEs, including central SOEs and regional SOEs, in the sectors concerned as 
part of a single economic unit, the proposed transaction would not raise any competition 
concerns. Indeed, recent decisions show that the Commission no longer tries to ascertain 
whether or not the Chinese SOEs involved have independent decision making power. 
Instead, it becomes a general practice that the Commission presumes that all Chinese 
SOEs in the same sector are one economic unit, ‘the China Inc.’, and then assess the 
competition implications of such a worst case scenario.140 
The Commission’s cautious ‘worst case scenario’ approach regarding Chinese SOEs 
makes sense in view of the complex nature between Chinese SOEs and the Chinese 
government. It also retains some flexibility for the Commission in dealing with the future 
cases. However, such an approach has created huge legal uncertainty  and imposed heavy 
financial costs on transactions involving Chinese SOEs. Suppose that a central SOE is 
contemplating an acquisition of a target company in Europe. The turnover of the central 
SOE, together with the turnover of the target European company, does not satisfy the 
turnover thresholds under the EUMR. However, if assessed by the current approach 
adopted by the Commission, the turnover thresholds are met. Should the companies 
concerned file a notification of concentration to the Commission? The SOE would find 
itself in a Catch-22 situation. Non-notification may lead to imposition of hefty fines if the 
Commission were, at some future point, to conclude that the central SOE was not an 
independent entity and that all Chinese SOEs in the same sector combined satisfied the 
turnover thresholds. Yet notification would mean prejudicing its own claim of being an 
independent market player.141 For the sake of prudence, the Chinese SOE involved in the 
139 Ibid., para. 15. 
140 See for example Case COMP/M.6151 – PetroChina/ Ineos/JV (13/05/2011) and Case COMP.6807- 
Mercuria Energy Asset Management/ Sinomart KTS Development / Vesta Terminals (07/03/2013). 
141 Kiran Desai & Manu Mohan, Fear of the Chinese or Business as Usual at the European Commission? 
EU Merger Regulation and the Assessment of Transactions Involving Chinese State-owned Enterprises, CPI 
Antitrust Chronicle, August 2011 (2), 8–9. 
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transaction may choose to file the notification. This however means that the companies 
concerned need to address the target’s horizontal and vertical relationship, not with the 
acquiring Chinese SOE group, but with the entire public economy of China.142 As a result, 
the scope of the information required to fill out the notification form would be gargantuan. 
Moreover, what if a worst scenario assessment concludes that the proposed concentration 
has competition implications in the EU market? The Commission would then be forced to 
make  a firm decision on whether the Chinese SOE involved is a genuine market entity 
enjoying independent decision-making power. 
4 ARE FEARS ABOUT CHINESE OFDI OVERWROUGHT? 
The intensified and sometimes politicized investment review processes have created huge 
uncertainties for Chinese investors with negative economic and political consequences.143 
It has given third parties, including competing bidders, business rivals and other 
stakeholders, the opportunity to utilize the national FDI review process in the name of 
national security or national interest to obtain leverage over the parties or to impact the 
timing and certainty of the transaction. 144  The increased completion risk sometimes 
forces Chinese companies to compensate sellers with a ‘Chinese buyer premium’.145 The 
Heritage Foundation reckons that over USD 200 billion-worth of potential deals have 
fallen through due to political opposition and some surprising regulatory obstacles.146 The 
high-handed treatment of Chinese SOE investments also raises the specter of 
discrimination. First, should national FDI regulations treat state capital differently from 
private capital? Second, do national FDI regulators treat equally state capital from 
different sources? For the first question, the US, Canada and Australia, with the notable 
exception of the EU, subject state capital to clearly enhanced level of scrutiny. For the 
second question, Stemsrud made the following sharp comments: 
One could never dare to say that the [European] Commission appears to apply the same legal 
standard to Chinese SOEs as it does towards European SOEs… In CNB/Elkem the acquiring entity 
is a highly commercialized company established in France (Bluestar), which is in addition to the 
142 Odd Stemsrud, ‘China Inc’ under Merger Regulation Review: The Commission’s Approach to 
Acquisitions by Chinese Public Undertakings, 10 Eur. Comp. L. Rev. 481, 486 (2011). 
143 Graham & Marchick, supra n. 76, at 141. 
144 Ilene Knable Gotts et al., Is your Cross-Border Deal the Next National Security Lightning Rod? Bus. L. 
Today, 31, 34 (2007). 
145 Silk & Malish, supra n. 1, at 126. 
146 The Economist, China’s Overseas Investment: ODI-Lay Hee-Ho (19 Jan. 2013). 
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80% shareholding of the Chinese SOE (ChemChina), is 20 percent owned by the NYSE listed 
Blackstone Group. One could be tempted to ask the question: if Bluestar’s parent was a German 
SOE, a French SOE, or an UK SOE, would the Commission still have market-tested Elkem 
against the entire public economy of that country as they did in CNB/Elkem? The answer to that 
question would, in my opinion, be: ‘Of course, not’.147 
Then, what is so special about Chinese SOEs? Are fears about Chinese SOEs’ OFDI 
justified? To answer these questions, we must review the nature and the status of SOEs in 
the Chinese political-economic context. 
4.1 THE REFORM OF CHINESE SOES 
Since China adopted the policy of reform and opening up to the outside world in 1978, 
market-oriented reforms in China have enabled China’s GDP to grow at an average rate 
of 9.5 % per year and its international trade by 18% in volume terms over the past thirty 
years. As a result, China is presently the world’s second largest national economy, a 
powerhouse in international trade, and a major destination for foreign investment.148 
However, China’s economic development model is fundamentally different from the 
western liberal capitalism model. A recent US State Department report noted that the 
state-owned sector accounts for approximately 40% of China’s GDP. 149  The SOEs 
comprise 950 of the 1000 largest firms in China. All but 100 of the 2037 firms listed on 
the Chinese stock exchange in 2012 were SOEs.150 
It is important to understand that modern Chinese SOEs are fundamentally different 
from their predecessors. In the socialist planned economy era, SOEs were basically 
production units rather than autonomous profit-seeking corporations. The planning 
commissions in national and local governments decided for each SOE what to produce, 
how much SOEs received of allocated materials, and where to sell the output and what 
price to sell.151 The absence of autonomy and incentive were widely recognized as the 
central problems facing SOEs in the period prior to reform. After the reform of SOEs 
began in 1980s, the Chinese government has taken a gradual, experimental and pragmatic 
147 Stemsrud, supra n. 141, at 486. 
148 Morrison, supra n. 1, at 3. 
149 US Department of State, Background Note: China (April 2008). 
150 John Lee, The Reemergence of China: Economic and Strategic Implications for Australia, 45 Austrl. 
Econ. Rev. 484 (2012). 
151 Becky Chiu & Mervyn Lewis, Reforming China’s State-owned Enterprises and Banks, 61 (Edward 
Edgar Publishing 2006). 
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approach of ‘crossing the river by touching the stone’.152 SOE reforms were deemed 
necessary in order to reduce economic losses, increase economic growth and raise living 
standards, from which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) derives its governing 
legitimacy.153 
There is a large body of literature on Chinese SOE reforms.154 Suffice to highlight here 
three main features of the reforms. First, the Chinese government has promoted the 
concentration of state-owned capital on strategic and pillar industries, and specified that 
SOEs should play a leading role in the key sectors. In order to achieve this objective, the 
Chinese government has provided selected SOEs with a range of financial and regulatory 
advantages. 155  Second, the State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
(SASAC), a quasi-governmental, ministerial-level agency operating directly under the 
State Council, was established to oversee the management of the SOEs. The Law on 
State-owned Assets of Enterprises in 2008 formally recognizes the SASAC as an 
‘investor’ and assigns the SASAC the legal rights and duties of a shareholder, holding 
SOE shares on behalf of the State.156 As an investor, the SASAC enjoys an owner’s 
equity rights and assumes legal liabilities under Chinese Company Law but it does not 
intervene directly in SOE operations, so that the ownership rights are separated from 
those of management. 157  Chinese leaders and SASAC officials have repeatedly 
emphasized that the SASAC must not meddle in the business operations of SOEs.158 
Third, after extensive reforms over the past two decades, the number of central SOEs was 
reduced from 196 in 2003 to 114 by 2014 under the oversight of the SASAC. Chinese 
SOEs have evolved from being parts of government ministries to legally stand-alone 
152 Xu Chenggang, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J. Econ. Lit., 
1076–1151 (2011); Lin Justin Yifu et al., Competition, Policy Burdens, and State-owned Enterprise Reform, 
88 Am. Econ. Rev. 422–427 (1998). 
153 Xi Li et al., A Model of China’s State Capitalism 9 (2012). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2061521 
154 Donald Clarke, Corporate Governance in China: An Overview, 14 China Econ. Rev. 497–507 (2003); 
See generally Sheng Hong and Zhao Ning, China’s State-owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and 
Reform (World Scientific Publishing, 2012). 
155 Yongheng Deng et al., Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market, 
NBER Working Paper 16871 (2011), at 10. 
156 Chapter 2 of PRC Law on State-owned Assets of Enterprises. 
157 Chiu & Lewis, supra n. 150, at 122. 




                                                          
enterprises that are empowered to make their own managerial, operational and production 
decisions. Modern corporate governance system has been established in Chinese SOEs 
and some of them could even rival the best private companies in the world. Many SOEs 
are listed in domestic and international stock exchanges and operate in compliance with 
the most rigorous stock market regulations. Chinese SOEs have improved their financial 
performance in the past decade and they have proactively engaged in global partnerships 
and acquisitions.159 
Nevertheless, these achievements cannot shield the fact that the management of SOEs 
continues to be influenced by policy considerations. This is because the CCP wields 
tremendous power in China. The CCP is the real decision maker when it comes to 
making senior personnel decisions in Chinese SOEs.160 The principle of ‘absolute control 
of (SOE) executives by the CCP’ is enshrined in various government regulations. The 
CCP and the SASAC have developed a sophisticated performance evaluation system for 
top executives of Chinese SOEs. 161  It is important to highlight that the financial 
performance of a SOE under the executive’s stewardship, though an important indicator, 
is not the sole criteria. ‘Political quality’, i.e. how well SOE executives adhere to CCP 
priorities and government directions, is also an important criterion against which 
managerial performance of SOE executives is evaluated.162 In short, the CCP and the 
SASAC are able to ensure the control over China’s most powerful business groups by 
having the power to appoint and remove their top management.163 
SOE executives therefore face two sets of incentives. On the one hand, they want the 
SOEs they manage to be profitable because their evaluations are based on the firm’s 
financial performance. On the other hand, their career paths are ultimately determined by 
the CCP which is equally, if not more, concerned with how well the executives respond 
159 Aldo Musacchio & Francisco Flores-Macias, The Return of State-owned Enterprises, Harvard Int’l. Rev. 
5 (2009). 
160 Szamosszegi & Kyle, supra n. 49, at 76; Mingxin Pei, The Dark Side of China’s Rise, Foreign Policy 
(March 2006). 
161 Provisional Measures Concerning the Integrated Evaluation of the Top Management Teams and 
Managers of the Central Enterprises, CCP Organization Department Doc. No. 17 (2009). 
162 Ibid., Art. 9 and Art. 10. 
163 Carl E Walter and Fraser JT Howie, Red Capitalism, 193 (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2012); Richard 
McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers, 49 (Harper Perennial 2011). 
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to the government directions and carry out the goals of the State. A top SOE executive 
judged unresponsive to the CCP policies risks not being promoted or even demoted, even 
if the SOE performs well.164 These dual criteria for evaluating SOE top executives – to 
deliver profits and serve the government’s interest – many times align. However, in the 
situation where an SOE’s financial interest and the State goal are in conflict, the 
incentives that SOE executives face will strongly encourage them to choose State interest 
over financial interests of the company and other non-state shareholders.165 Numerous 
researches have revealed that the goals of the state are dominant in SOE executives’ 
decision-making processes. For example, Yang and his colleagues found that winning 
political promotion is more important than financial compensation in shaping SOE 
executives’ behavior.166 There is also evidence that top executive turnovers in listed 
Chinese SOEs are significantly less related to financial performance indicators than in 
other listed firms.167 
4.2 EXAGGERATED THREATS OF CHINESE SOES’ OVERSEAS 
INVESTMENT 
Despite extensive SOE reforms, the transformation in the role of the state in China is by 
no means complete, and the Chinese government still retains power to intervene in high-
profile deals. However, the possibility that the Chinese government may influence the 
decision-making of SOEs should not the end of the inquiry. A relevant question is how 
likely will the Chinese government exercise this power and direct an SOE to engage in 
politically charged activities. Such a possibility must also be balanced against 
protectionism that could ultimately harm the markets and companies of host countries. I 
submit that possible threats from Chinese SOEs taking over domestic enterprises have 
been  grossly exaggerated. Even if the Chinese government controls the appointment and 
the removal of SOE executives, it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the 
164 Deng et al., supra n. 154, at 16. 
165 Szamosszegi & Kyle, supra n. 49, at 79. 
166 Yang Ruilong, Wang yuan and Nie Huihua, The Promotion Mechanism of ‘Quasi-officials’: Evidence 
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Chinese government is behind all major OFDI decisions or that Chinese SOEs are 
pursuing a coordinated political agenda.168 
To begin with, contrary to theories that depict Chinese OFDI as part of a grand 
political game or an emerging world power struggle, Chinese OFDI policies are based on 
simple economics. China’s desire for natural resources and advanced technology is open 
and well-known. The foundations for Chinese OFDI are neither subtle nor dangerous.169 
In reality, Chinese SOEs have been evincing strong commercial motivations in making 
OFDI decisions and these decisions are being exercised to a large extent independently of 
their sovereign sponsor.170 For example, the Chinese government encourages the National 
Oil Corporations (NOCs) to go global and help ensure China’s energy supply security. 
The Chinese NOCs have made tremendous progress in securing equity oil from foreign 
countries.171 However, not all the equity oil produced abroad was shipped back to China 
despite China’s huge domestic demand. In 2006, two thirds of all oil production that 
China’s NOCs pumped abroad was sold on the international market.172 In Sudan, Chinese 
companies have at times sold much more of their oil production to Japan than they have 
sent home.173 Part of the reasons may be that it makes more economic sense for Chinese 
NOCs to sell it at world market price than transporting back to China.174 In CNOOC’s 
acquisition of Unocal in 2005, it was later revealed that the CNOOC bid was undertaken 
almost entirely at the initiative of CNOOC, and over the fierce objection and stubborn 
hesitation of the central government.175 The ‘China Inc’ image, where all Chinese SOEs 
are following a centrally coordinated strategy, cannot be further from the truth. The 
extensive corporatization and marketization in the past decades have transformed Chinese 
SOEs into market-oriented and self-interest motivated players.176 There has been fierce 
168 Rosen & Hanemann, supra n. 15, at 11. 
169 Scissors, supra n. 6. 
170 OECD, supra n. 14, at 93; Margaret Cornish, Behavior of Chinese SOEs: Implications for Investment 
and Cooperation in Canada (February 2012), at 15. 
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competition among SOEs. Sometime the competition is so fierce that Chinese NOCs bid 
against each other over foreign projects, such as PetroChina and Sinopec in Sudan and 
Libya as well as between CNOOC and Sinopec in Brazil.177 
Furthermore, except some ultra-sensitive areas such as the transfer of military 
technology, it is difficult to see what exactly Chinese SOEs could do to threaten the 
national security of a host country. Moran offered a framework to separate plausible 
national security threats from implausible claims. According to Moran, the first category 
of threat springs from the prospect that the proposed acquisition would make the host 
country dependent upon a foreign-controlled supplier of goods or services crucial to the 
functioning of the national economy. The second category embodies the concern that the 
proposed acquisition would allow transfer of technology or other expertise to a foreign-
controlled entity that might be deployed by the entity or its government in a manner 
harmful to that host country’s national interests. The third category of threat is that the 
proposed acquisition would allow insertion of some potential capability for infiltration, 
surveillance, or sabotage into the provision of goods or services crucial to the functioning 
of that economy.178 Applying Moran’s framework to a number of blocked or withdrawn 
transactions, it is apparent that national security concerns could be easily abused to hide 
protectionist motives. In the CNOOC- Unocal controversy, concerns were expressed that 
CNOOC might divert Unocal’s energy supplies exclusively to meet Chinese needs. But 
facts were that Unocal accounted for only 0.8% of US production of oil and national gas 
and the majority of its reserves and production were outside the US. Even if CNOOC 
rerouted all Unocal’s US production to China, which is economically penalizing for 
CNOOC and its controller, it would not harm the US interest because US buyers could 
easily replace Unocal’s miniscule production with imports from the international market, 
leaving net imports and US balance of payments in energy unchanged.179 Indeed, even in 
the Drivers and Impacts, International Energy Agency Information Paper (February 2011), at 25; Cornish, 
supra n. 169, at 15. 
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the event of hostility, since FDI is illiquid and cannot be withdrawn, the acquired foreign 
assets actually would represent a hostage in a host country’s hands. 
Next, multiple external parties are involved in Chinese SOEs’ OFDI decision-making 
process. These parties include international investment banks, law firms, accounting 
firms, rating agencies, corporate partners and financiers. An OFDI decision cannot be 
made solely by a government entity.180 The strong commercial motivations of Chinese 
SOEs in their OFDI are testified by international experts working on the transactions. 
Moreover, a range of economic and political factors limit the likelihood that Chinese 
SOEs will be used by the Chinese government as a political tool in reality. First, there is 
evidence that politically motivated investments often do not make much economic 
sense. 181  The commercial pressure on Chinese SOEs is growing rapidly and it is 
implausible to assume that Chinese SOEs’ OFDI can always be made with little 
consideration of economic feasibilities. Second, a Chinese SOE’s OFDI project, once 
completed, is fully subject to the regulatory framework of the host country. A rigorous 
enforcement of the laws of the host country is likely to deal with most  of the concerns 
presented by the SOE investment. For example, corporate laws impose robust fiduciary 
duties on the controlling shareholder and the directors and senior management of the 
company. These fiduciary duties place a liability restraint on SOEs as a controlling 
shareholder and their appointed directors.182 Most significantly, if Chinese SOEs engage 
in politically charged activities against economic interests in a host country, then they 
risk political, economic and legal responses with dire consequences. Such activities could 
surely bring heightened political and regulatory scrutiny of all the investments in the host 
country and probably in every jurisdiction in which Chinese SOEs have invested. Given 
the suspicion generally surrounding SOEs’ investments and the fact that they usually 
operate under unique scrutiny, Chinese SOEs will act hyper-cautiously. The costs of 
political activity would seem to far outweigh any potential benefits.183 
180 Megan Bowman et al., China: Investing in the World, CIFR Research Working Paper Series (September 
2013), at 11. 
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Finally, it may be understandable to exaggerate the potential risk that Chinese SOEs’ 
OFDI might pose to a host country. But after China has implemented the ‘Go Global’ 
policy for more than a decade, to what extent do the available data support the argument 
that Chinese SOEs pose unique risks to a host country? Statistics from Australia show 
that Chinese investors usually acquire a passive minority interest at the corporate level. 
Approximately 50% of completed investments were for the acquisition of a 10% or 20% 
shareholding interest.184 Even if Chinese investors gain a controlling interest, they rely 
heavily on local talent to manage Australian companies. During the period 1 January 
2005 to 31 December 2012, Chinese nationals were appointed as Chief Executive Officer 
only in 32% of acquisitions and Chief Operating Officer in only 10% in the energy and 
resources sectors. 185  A report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)also shows that experience-sharing among recipient countries has 
not revealed any serious problems related to investment made by foreign government-
controlled investors.186 
5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
It is important not to overstate the impact of China’s OFDI on the global investment 
system. Despite the media buzz, China’s OFDI is still relatively small and only represents 
a miniscule presence in Western countries. The assertion that China is ‘buying up the 
world’ is simply not true. The reasons why Chinese OFDI have attracted so much media 
attention are simply the phenomenal rate at which it is growing- it multiplied ten times 
between 2005 and 2011 and significant investment in the energy sector.187 Similarly, the 
claim that Western countries are indiscriminately biased again Chinese investors is not 
supported by facts. To be fair, except a small number of high-profile blocks in energy, 
mining and telecommunication industries, the vast majority of China’s OFDI projects 
were  reviewed and approved without much controversy. In September 2013, CFIUS 
allowed Smithfield Foods Inc., the world’s largest hog and pork producer, to be acquired 
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by China’s Shuanghui International Holdings Ltd. in what would be the biggest Chinese 
purchase of a US firm.188 Still, the controversy over Chinese SOEs’ OFDI is a textbook 
example of how misperception and a lack of trust can set road blocks for international 
business transactions. 
5.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR HOST COUNTRIES 
History repeats itself. The current debate over China’s OFDI could be a case of déjà vu 
reminding the world that similar stories happened to Japan three decades ago.189 In 1988, 
the US Congress approved the Exon- Florio provision in response to concerns over 
foreign acquisition of certain types of US firms by Japanese firms. Two decades later, 
Japanese firms have not taken over the US and indeed, the US economy has benefited 
enormously from the inbound foreign investment.190 Arguably current concerns are partly 
due to the vulnerability of some Western economies after the unprecedented global 
financial crisis and the subsequent legitimacy crisis of liberal capitalist ideals.191 Still, 
when formulating policies addressing Chinese SOEs’ OFDI, it is helpful to recall how 
alarmists may successfully generate unfounded fears which may in turn strain 
international economic relations with negative economic consequences. 
As Part III  of this article shows, host countries enjoy ample leeway and possess 
adequate instruments which allow them to monitor foreign investment and block any 
projects which threaten to compromise national security. Current international law 
imposes little constraint on host countries to exercise this self-judging power. The real 
problem is the opposite: from time to time, national FDI review process falls victim to 
populism and protectionism. In view of the already highly politicized FDI review process 
in some countries, the suggestion that host countries seek additional unilateral measures 
to block  Chinese SOEs’ investments seems to be misconceived.192 
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In order to make critical business decisions, both Chinese and foreign executives of a 
host country need to determine beforehand whether the bids may be rejected on national 
security or national interest grounds. Greater clarity on this issue would benefit all parties 
both by maximizing the assets value and preventing tit-for-tat treatment abroad.193 This is 
of course not to suggest that national security is not a legitimate concern. The point is 
only that national security clauses should be applied with restraint and should not be a 
general escape clause for host countries to renege on commitments to open investment 
policies. 
Several OECD reports provide a useful framework to balance the delicate relationship 
between national security and an open investment environment. The OECD Declaration 
on Sovereign Wealth Funds and Recipient Country Policies was adopted by the OECD 
Council in June 2008.194 As the policy concerns raised by SOEs are similar to SWFs, the 
principles outlined for the regulation of SWFs are also applicable to SOEs.195 The OECD 
Declaration is hoped to foster mutually beneficial situations where SWFs enjoy fair 
treatment in recipient country markets and recipient countries can confidently resist 
pressures for protectionist responses. Within this context, national security is recognized 
as a legitimate limitation only if the national security principles are narrowly drawn. 
However, sovereign investment might serve as a legitimate basis for protection when a 
home country  uses it for foreign policy rather than commercial purposes, to obtain 
sensitive technology, or to aid the intelligence capabilities of a foreign country that is 
hostile to the host country.196 The OECD Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment 
Policies Relating to National Security were adopted in May 2009.197 This framework 
suggests that recipient countries should not erect protectionist barriers to foreign 
investment and discriminate among investors in like circumstances. Where such national 
security concerns do arise, investment policies by recipient countries should be guided by 
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the principles of non-discrimination, transparency of policies and predictability of 
outcomes, proportionality of measures and accountability of implementing authorities.198 
As Howson pointed out, China’s ‘Go Global’ policy represents a new phase of China’s 
behavior-changing entanglement with foreign and international legal, commercial and 
governance norms, all with direct effects inside China. The Chinese government, Chinese 
enterprises and various Chinese commercial instruments were forced for the first time to 
play by internationally accepted rules not only during the whole acquisition phase but 
even with respect to internal corporate governance at the firms themselves.199 In fact, 
while China’s OFDI has witnessed rapid growth, the performance of China’s overseas 
business ventures has reportedly been less than satisfactory, with close to one-third are in 
the red.200 Clearly, Chinese companies operating overseas face a steep learning curve in 
making the right OFDI decisions, as well as international management and marketing 
acumen. Though the learning curve is steep, China’s ‘Go Global’ policy has started a 
socialization process bringing value to both China and the global economy. It is simply a 
bad policy choice, both economically and politically, to reject Chinese investments not on 
legitimate grounds but under the influence of misinformed populism and protectionism. 
5.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHINA’S ONGOING SOE REFORMS 
Though there is a strong suspicion of state capital in some quarters, state capital itself has 
never become a significant issue in international business transactions.  It has long been 
established that the source of capital itself, without more, should not be a basis for 
discriminatory treatment by states.201As long as SOEs do not exercise governmental 
functions, have independent power of decision-making free from government 
interference and are run on a commercial basis, there is no reason to treat SOEs 
differently from private enterprises. It should be noted that these are exactly the goals of 
Chinese SOE reforms announced by the Chinese government. As early as 1993 after 
Deng Xiaoping’s historical southern tour, the goal of Chinese SOE reforms was set to 
198 Ibid., 3–4. 
199 Howson, supra n. 174, at 74. 
200 First Financial and Economic Daily, The Total Amount of Chinese OFDI has Increased for Consecutive 
Ten Years, Close to 30% are Losing Money, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-08-31/093025074663.shtml. 
201 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/AB/R (11 Mar. 2011), para. 318; Recital 22 of EUMR. 
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require SOEs to be modern enterprises characterized by ‘clear property rights, well-
defined power and responsibility, separation of enterprise from government, and 
scientific management’.202 Moreover, to address the concerns of the Working Party about 
the integration of China’s ‘socialist market system’ into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), China confirmed in the Accession Protocol that ‘the Government of China would 
not influence, directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of state-owned or 
state-invested enterprises, including on the quantity, value or country of origin of any 
goods purchased or sold, except in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement’.203 
Since the Chinese government and the international community share similar expectation 
of how Chinese SOEs should be run, the recent attention to Chinese SOEs’ OFDI may be 
recast in a more positive light, as an external incentive for the Chinese government to 
accelerate the implementation of the reform strategy that it has already committed to 
almost two decades ago. 
The Chinese government is advised to continue the  efforts to reduce governmental 
interference into SOEs’ decision-making processes; eliminate financial and regulatory 
benefits conferred on SOEs and upgrade corporate governance standards in SOEs in 
order to entrench their commercial orientation. These reform measures will not only 
reduce suspicion and misunderstanding when SOEs ‘Go Global’, but also make SOEs 
truly competitive global companies. In this regard, several OECD documents provide 
helpful guidance on internal corporate governance of SOEs as well as when SOEs 
operate abroad. 
The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE 
Guidelines) adopted in 2005 is primarily oriented at SOEs using a distinct legal form and 
having a commercial activity, whether or not they pursue a public policy objective as 
well. 204  The SOE Guidelines constitutes the first international benchmark to help 
governments improve the corporate governance of SOEs by providing standards and 
202 Decision on Issues Regarding the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic System, para. 1 (2), 
http://finance.ifeng.com/opinion/jjsh/20090906/1199906.shtml. 
203 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (1 Oct. 2001) para. 46. 
204 OECD, OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises (OECD Publishing 
2005), at 10. 
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good practices, as well as guidance on implementation.205 Grounded in principles of 
transparency and the separation of function, its objective is to neutralize the sovereign in 
the operation and control of these enterprises.206 Thus neutralized, the SOE Guidelines 
expects to create a level playing field in markets where SOEs and private sector 
companies compete in order to avoid market distortion.207 For that purpose, the SOE 
Guidelines specifically requires that SOEs face competitive conditions regarding access 
to finance and avoid indirect market distortions and avoid indirect subsidies through 
cross-ownership of state enterprises. 208  Realizing that SOEs face some distinct 
governance challenges, the SOE Guidelines treat transparency as a key factor in 
governing SOEs. Applying the SOE Guidelines to SOEs operating abroad, the OECD 
document highlighted the importance of separating SOEs’ commercial and other 
objectives, and the governance arrangements in place to lend credibility to the objectives 
as well as mechanisms for transparency and accountability. 209  Undoubtedly, the 
implementation of these principles would go a long way towards addressing competitive 
issues associated with SOEs as well as alleviating host country concerns about SOEs’ 
uncertain corporate objectives.210 Currently, the OECD 2005 SOE Guidelines are under 
revision and the 2014 revised SOE Guidelines will be submitted to the OECD Corporate 
Governance Committee for approval in November 2014.211 The 2014 Guidelines will 
take into account developments since the Guidelines were first adopted in 2005 and the 
experiences of the growing number of countries that have taken steps to implement their 
recommendations.212 
 
205 P Kowalski et al., State-owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications, OECD Trade Policy 
Papers No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), at 38. 
206 OECD, supra n. 203, at 13. 
207 Ibid., at 18. 
208 Ibid., at 12. 
209 OECD, SOEs Operating Abroad: An Application of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises to the Cross-border Operations of SOEs (2010), 4–5. 
210 Antonio Capobianco and Hans Christiansen, Competitive Neutrality and State-owned Enterprises: 
Challenges and Policy Options, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 1 (OECD Publishing, 
2011). 
211 OECD, 2014 Revision of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-owned Enterprises, 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/revisionoftheoecdguidelinesoncorporategovernanceofstate-
ownedenterprises.htm 
212 Ibid.  
41 
 
                                                          
In May 2008, the International Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
created under the International Monetary Fund drafted the ‘Santiago Principles’.213 The 
purpose of the Santiago Principles is to identify a framework of generally accepted 
principles and practices that properly reflect appropriate governance, accountability, and 
arrangements as well as the conduct of investment practices by SWFs on a prudent and 
sound basis.214 The Santiago Principles cover practices and principles in three key areas 
and they are grounded in four guiding objectives. Three key areas are: (i) legal 
framework, objectives coordination with macroeconomic policies; (ii) institutional 
framework and governance structure; and (iii) investment and risk management 
framework. Four guiding principles are: (i) the maintenance of financial stability and free 
capital flows, (ii) compliance with applicable laws of host countries, (iii) an idealized 
private investor strategy for investments, focusing on investments on the basis of 
economic and financial risk and return-related considerations and (iv) adhering SWFs 
ought to have in place systems of transparency and a sound governance structure that 
provide for adequate operational controls, risk management and accountability.215 By 
enacting the principles, the IMG aimed to assure host countries of the absence of 
threatening political agendas affected through sovereign investment activity. Thus 
convinced, the hope is to avoid host country lawmaking that would inhibit sovereign 
investing.216 
Granted, in view of the very special political economy context in China, there will be 
doubts as to whether the Chinese government will ever be able to run its SOEs on a 
commercial manner without changing the current Chinese political system. 217  Such 
pessimism should be tempered. To begin with, China is not alone in controlling a 
substantial number of strong SOEs. Other countries such as Singapore, Norway and 
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France also have a large state sector.218 The SOEs in these countries do not seem to be a 
big concern for other countries. Moreover, the new Chinese leadership has brought 
unprecedented momentum to reform Chinese SOEs at the Third Plenary Session of the 
18th CCP Central Committee in November 2013.219 The CCP vowed to make the market 
play a decisive role in allocating resources so as to deepen economic structural reform. 
As one of the fifteen key reform areas, a ‘mixed ownership economy’ in which both the 
public sector and non-public sector economy are important components will be 
developed. This objective requires further consolidation of the state-owned sector and the 
perfection of the modern corporate system for SOEs. 220  More detailed SOE reform 
measures include organization of state-owned capital investment and operation 
companies, more public disclosure of SOE finances, perfection of the enterprise 
bankruptcy system; increase of dividend pay-out ratio for SOEs from the current 5–15% 
to 30% by 2020, and promotion of ‘interlocking shareholding’ by encouraging non-public 
sector stakes in SOEs.221  It is clear that China is in the midst of the biggest attempt in 
more than a decade to reform the SOEs.223 
5.3 EMERGING REGULATION OF SOES IN INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
Even though states bear few international legal obligations with regard to the regulation 
of SOEs, voluntary codes of conduct have been introduced to systematize approaches to 
the regulation of government-controlled entities and their overseas investments. These 
voluntary codes of conduct are soft law principles intended to develop both a foundation 
for customs to form around benchmarked practices and an international consensus in 
conceptualizing the government-controlled entities in the global markets.224 They usually 
encourage home states to take steps to strengthen transparency and governance of SOEs 
and at the same time urge host states to avoid protectionist responses that could 
218 Hans Christiansen, The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries, OECD Corporate 
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undermine economic growth and development. The OECD SOE Guidelines and Santiago 
Principles mentioned above are typical examples. 
More recently, there have been considerable efforts to impose binding legal obligations 
on states to regulate SOEs in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and regional trade 
agreements (RTAs). These new-generation BITs and RTAs oblige the parties to ensure 
that SOEs act in a manner that is consistent with the parties’ obligations under these 
RTAs or BITs when they exercise the delegated government authority; act solely in 
accordance with commercial considerations in their purchase of goods or services; 
provide non-discriminatory treatment to covered investments; not to enter into anti-
competitive agreements among competitors or engage in exclusionary practices; and that 
the parties shall not influence or direct decisions of the SOEs.225 
As an outcome of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue in May 2012, China and the 
US agreed to intensify negotiation for a US – China BIT on the basis of the 2012 US 
Model BIT.226 It is hoped that the BIT would allow the US to address many of the 
broader issues posed by Chinese SOEs’ OFDI. 227  The SOE problem is also being 
addressed in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations.228 Some people in the US 
see the TPP as a means of managing the ability of states, principally China, to blend state 
and private power through SOEs.229 Current proposals that seek commitments from TPP 
members would (1) require that SOEs investing or operating in the markets of other 
signatories act on commercial considerations; (2) ensure that SOEs do not receive 
subsidies or financing or other benefits from their governments that unfairly advantage 
them with respect to investment abroad; (3) include a reporting/monitoring and 
225 For instance, Art. 16.3 of the US – Korea Free Trade Agreement; Art. 11.4 of the EU-Korea Free Trade 
Agreement; 2012 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty; Art. 12.3 of the US –Singapore Free Trade 
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information request mechanism; and (4) provide for a dispute settlement mechanism.230 
China is not yet a party in TPP negotiations. However, if the TPP were successfully 
concluded, the SOE provisions in the TPP Agreement would set a precedent for future 
BITs and RTAs, including agreements that China may seek to join or negotiate. Indeed, 
the SOE problem tops the agenda of the new round of RTA talks between China and 
other countries. Australia’s Trade Minister Craig Emerson admitted in April 2013 that: 
‘… talks on a free-trade deal with China have stalled because of a dispute over 
restrictions on investment in Australia by Chinese state-owned enterprises’.231 
6 CONCLUSION 
For decades, FDI means investment from developed countries to developing countries. 
More recently, a new trend of FDI from developing countries to developed countries has 
started. In 2012, developed economies saw their FDI outflows fell close to the trough of 
2009. By contrast, FDI flows from developing countries rose slightly.232 In 2013, FDI 
flows from developed countries continued to stagnate whilst flows from developing 
countries remained resilient, rising by 3%.233  In total, FDI by transnational corporations 
from developing countries reached $454 billion in 2013 – another record high. Together 
with transitional economies, they accounted for 39% of global FDI outflows, compared 
with only 12% at the beginning of the 2000s. 234 The global OFDI has become a two-way 
street and this is an integral part of the globalization process.  
The Chinese government’s embrace of ‘Go Global’ policy is a logical consequence of 
the country’s success in attracting inbound FDI and promoting exports in previous 
decades. It is also consistent with the overall framework of continuing reform and 
liberalization of the Chinese economy.235 However, there has been a backlash against 
Chinese SOE investments in some Western countries. This article takes a close look at 
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the underlying drivers of the Chinese OFDI as well as regulatory responses of some 
Western countries. This article argues that China’s OFDI has become increasingly  driven 
by Chinese SOEs’ own commercial motivations. Chinese SOEs need a clear, predictable 
and reliable legal environment for their outbound investments. This article also urges the 
Chinese government to push forward SOE reforms in China. In this respect, several 
international voluntary codes of conduct and the new-generation BITs and RTAs offer 
some helpful guidance. The implementation of these internationally recognized principles 
would help alleviate concerns when Chinese SOEs ‘Go Global’. 
The Chinese government has recently launched a new round of far-reaching economic 
reforms. The decision to reform Chinese SOEs was announced and the implementation 
rules are being drafted and unveiled.236  It is also reported that there is a decline of state 
capital in China’s OFDI and outbound investments made by Chinese private enterprises 
have surged since Spring 2012.237 It seems that it will not be long when the world comes 
to realize that there is nothing to fear about Chinese SOEs but fear itself. 
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